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What actions have been taken in developing countries to carry out the functions of a country’s 
central bank after the collapse of the central bank, and to support recovery from collapse?  What 
was attempted and what were the outcomes? 
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 Executive summary 1.
The inability of a central bank to operate has a range of impacts which include: 
 Loss of control of and influence over the exchange rate. 
 Loss of the ability to provide guarantees and credit lines of both domestic and foreign 
currency. 
 No supervision of the domestic financial system. 
 No provision of domestic currency/notes. 
Exchange rate challenges include: 
 Where an official rate exists, a growing spread between what was the “official rate” and 
the parallel market will usually occur, increasing costs to the economy.   
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 Most economies will shift from domestic currency to a preference for foreign currency as 
a means to conserve wealth and for larger transactions. 
 The challenge will be to minimise the costs to the economy such as transaction costs and 
fragmented exchange rates which encourage rent seeking and arbitrage, and seek to 
increase the benefits such as competitive exchange rates for exporters. 
The absence of guarantees and credit lines leads to: 
 A lack of liquidity in the domestic financial sector, reducing access to credit and other 
financial services.   
 Imports and exports will be constrained for lack of credit lines and guarantees, leading to 
a cash economy requiring pre-payments.  
 Responses can include seeking specific credit lines to support key imports and 
investments, as well as leveraging inflows such as remittances. 
Supervision of the domestic banking system impact on: 
 Local financial systems which can face challenges to accessing international financial 
services (such as correspondent banks required for international money transfers)
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, and 
have a heightened risk of fraud. 
Provision of cash (notes) means that: 
 The domestic notes will effectively face excessive use leading to shortages as notes get 
damaged; the shortage may lead to a temporary holding of value given relative scarcity. 
 In the medium term, domestic notes will be replaced by counterfeited notes, foreign 
currencies, and other forms of exchange (ie: barter). 
Responses of countries will vary according to the domestic situation, however: 
 Short run interventions can temporarily impact on the market and prices; however these 
tend to be costly.  Significant resources are required to have a more definite impact 
(usually an IMF-supported programme) 
 In the medium run, allocating resources to work with the market to support positive 
incentives, and work against rent seeking and other economic costs are recommended. 
 While not covered in this note, it is highly likely that poorer sectors of society will be 
impacted disproportionately by the consequences of central bank collapse. 
 Introduction 2.
This note will focus on the impact of central bank collapse on managing exchange rates and 
credit lines which are critical for essential imports. It also notes other risks and potential 
responses when central bank functions are severely limited or not in place.   
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 An international task force is working to address the challenge of correspondent banks 
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It draws on the literature available following relevant challenges in a range of countries where 
central bank capacity is either very weak (post-conflict, following major balance of payment 
crisis) or effectively doesn’t exist2.  While this note seeks to give an overview of the challenges of 
a central bank collapse, it is also written bearing in mind the challenges faced in Yemen in March 
2017.   
 Consequences and responses to central bank collapse 3.
In countries with an official exchange rate, a weak or collapsed central bank will mean the 
parallel market rate with increasingly determine prices. 
Dependent on what can be challenging political trade-offs, this a likely scenario where there is no 
formal decision to act on the exchange rate in the short to medium run. 
In the context of Somalia, a mostly unregulated “free” market has taken over. The very 
significant remittances estimated at around 70% of GDP are “an instrument for trade and 
commerce in Somalia and abroad” (Sanogo, pg16. 2011).  Much of these flows are through 
hawala
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 schemes.  However the USD now dominates all major transactions including 
remittances, with the local Somali Shilling reserved for smaller transactions especially in rural 
areas. South Sudan’s central bank faces capacity challenges, including minimal foreign 
exchange reserves. Most imports, including basic food necessities, are based on cash trade 
financed through the parallel exchange rate and through fragmented small to medium importers.  
The impact of this includes significant mark-ups of cost compared to neighbouring countries 
given the very considerable transaction costs faced by traders (Dorosh 2015). 
Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s had a technically capable and politically strong central bank, 
however it had exhausted reserves and increasingly lost market credibility as inflation took hold.  
Official exchange rates and official (controlled) prices ensured access to an ever smaller well 
connected group as rent seeking took over from an initial attempt to prioritise foreign exchange 
for essential and productive imports.   
For the population in general, de facto prices were set by the parallel market for goods sold in the 
formal and then rapidly growing informal sector.  Trade took place using (illegal) USD/South 
African Rand, barter especially using fuel, or livestock, as the “hard currency” or payments 
outside Zimbabwe for those with access to foreign exchange.   
Moving towards the parallel market rate can reduce these challenges. Myanmar has sought to 
influence the (well developed) parallel market rate by floating the official rate and holding daily 
auctions.  In practise, analysis of the data suggests that at best the influence has been limited at 
a cost to their Central Bank’s very limited reserves, although it has served for the Central Bank to 
determine an official rate which effectively is the parallel rate (Kubo 2015). 
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 It also doesn’t look at IMF financed programmes which would be the more usual option countries take when 
facing a balance of payment crisis and major challenges at central bank level. 
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 A traditional system of transferring money used in Arab countries and South Asia, whereby the money is paid to 
an agent who then instructs an associate in the relevant country or area to pay the final recipient. (Oxford English 
Dictionary) 
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The economic welfare costs of parallel markets will vary according to the context given welfare 
benefits to remittances and export prices through a more competitive exchange rate, versus the 
cost of penalties, cost to the state in lost revenue and foreign exchange, likelihood of increased 
rent seeking, and likely shift to foreign exchange reducing seigniorage revenue through the 
reduced requirement of local currency.  Similarly, evidence suggests that unification of the 
exchange rate tends not to affect prices significantly as a) prices are mostly set by the parallel 
market rate already, and b) it is control over fiscal spend that determines any significant further 
impact on inflation or not, making anticipating and managing the fiscal impacts of unification of 
exchange rates especially important (Agénor 1992). 
Some academics and policy makers do support the case for more interventionist central banks 
(eg: guarantees, credit lines, effective capital controls).  This can support growth and 
development including more stable, but not overvalued, exchange rate through the 
implementation of capital controls (Epstein 2009). However this also implies a modest spread 
between the official and parallel rate which is unlikely to reflect major costs to the economy.  This 
does assume some capacity of the central bank to operate controls effectively. 
A less common option has been to formally accept a foreign currency as legal tender 
Outsourcing currency to a hard currency, primarily USD, though also Euro, has been an option 
some countries have taken – de jure dollarization. The arguments include benefits of savings on 
trade and interest rates and therefore higher growth (Swiston 2011 makes the case for these 
savings in the case of El Salvador), and the benefits of lower inflation.  However Towers et al 
(2004), concluded the benefits were effectively captured by larger formal sector and upper 
middle class, and do not factor in the cost of lost revenue including from seigniorage to the State.   
Ecuador formally dollarized as a result of a major banking crisis.  The central bank had been 
unable to anticipate and prepare for this crisis and did not have the resources to manage it out 
credibly
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.  This decision to formally dollarize did stabilise the economy, although this was helped 
by an increase of foreign exchange flows (Jácome 2004).  However the recent strengthening of 
the USD (and fall in oil prices) has put pressure on Ecuador, not least as its (larger) neighbours 
have all responded to global economic slow-down through devaluation of their own currencies 
(Wang 2016). 
In January 2009, Zimbabwe legalised five foreign currencies, and the government moved to use 
the USD which became the dominant currency in use, the South African rand being a distant 
second.  This succeeded in bringing stability to the economy, and a period of negative inflation 
as the risk premium of the parallel market was done away with (Noko 2011).   
It has however come with the cost of lost flexibility and shortage of smaller notes/coin, and 
similar to Ecuador, the now strong USD has put significant pressure on the Zimbabwe economy 
which has been unable to adjust. One study (Buigut 2015) concluded that Zimbabwe’s exports 
are likely to be around 15% lower than they would have been if a domestic currency had been 
maintained. 
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 There are broader political economy challenges that help explain the crisis more fully; however the crisis was 
triggered by a sharp fall in oil prices.  As Ecuador’s largest export it resulted in significantly lower USD inflows, 
and this meant the economy was in a very weak position. 
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Edwards (2003) summarised the evidence on using the USD rather than a domestic currency to 
conclude that there is a clear impact on lower inflation, but a tendency to experience lower 
growth in the sample. The author also recognises the limitations to the data
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. 
Cambodia offers the example of a semi-dollarized economy – de facto dollarization - with the 
USD used for most transactions, and local currency used for mostly smaller transactions.  
Effectively both currencies are legal tender.  An estimated 90% of currency in circulation is USD, 
as are 97% of deposits, and with the domestic currency having a marginal role, its exchange rate 
is effectively fixed to the USD through expectations rather than a formal policy.  The benefit has 
been stability, which was especially sought in the years after the war and arguably helped 
encourage significant investment in Cambodia supporting its export-led growth.  The cost has 
been an estimated 2% GDP (at least) in terms of lost seigniorage (Menon 2008) and more 
recently, the challenges of a strong USD for exporters.   
De facto dollarization is significantly more common and usually found in post-crisis and post-
conflict countries.  Having a partially dollarized economy does provide a means for the population 
and economy to protect against the crisis and inflation, and can facilitate financial transactions 
and help provide investor confidence.  However it also has a cost to the macro-economy in terms 
of reduced seigniorage and weaker transmission of monitory policy.  De-dollarization is possible 
though not automatic once greater stability is achieved.  Countries that have been successful in 
de-dollarization have only managed it once there is sustained and credible stability and low 
inflation. (Alvarez-Plata 2007)  
In dollarized economies, there is an argument to focus on managing the associated risks rather 
than the benefits and costs.  Unless backed by very significant reserves, a run on the financial 
sector that is predominantly dollar-based, cannot be underwritten by the central bank.  In 
recognition of this risk, a number of countries require greater prudence of their banking system 
when dealing with dollar credit lines and savings.  This in turn can help nudge towards greater 
use of domestic currency without significant (and often ineffective) controls on foreign currency 
use which risks creating uncertainty in the economy.  (Heysen 2005).   
In some cases, financing vehicles can be set up that at least temporarily help with access 
to trade finance and enable imports at (lower) official rates. 
The literature provides a larger sample from the 1970s/80s, when fixed exchange rates were 
more common and a number of countries faced chronic balance of payment challenges triggered 
by increases in oil prices. These include Kenya using tea export revenues for fertiliser and other 
agro-inputs, and Tanzanian coffee exports for oil imports.  Ghana used its cocoa exports to 
protect foreign exchange and a stable exchange rate for imported oil and priority 
pharmaceuticals, and adapted this approach during the transition phase to a more flexible 
exchange rate to partially protect consumers (USAID 1989).  It was also able to leverage the 
seasonal cocoa exports to raise financing from the commercial sector (Auditor-General of Ghana 
1994). 
                                                   
5
 Other than small nation states and Puerto Rico, Panama and for a period also Liberia, are the only medium size 
countries to formally use the USD as their national currency.  Since early 2000s, Ecuador, El Salvador and 
Zimbabwe have also opted for the USD which will over time provide more lessons including as a response to 
macro-ecnomic crisis. 
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More recently Egypt has ring fenced limited foreign exchange through “special” auctions for 
essential imports such as cereals and oil. This was effective for a period to protect consumers 
from price rises, though at a cost to reserves and once these were depleted, then support from 
countries in the region. Egypt also managed to raise financing from the Islamic Trade and 
Finance Corporation (part of IsDB), providing an example of a multi-lateral backed syndicated 
Murabaha
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 loan at competitive rates (ITFC 2012)
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.  Zimbabwe has similarly made use of funding 
on several occasions from the Afroeximbank
8
 to provide foreign exchange for specific needs 
such as food imports during periods of drought (eg: Afroeximbank 2014) 
Bilateral Payment Arrangements (BPAs) have been put in place in a number of countries.  These 
primarily are facilities set up between two countries for major exports and required imports, and 
arguably a form of credit line provided by the exporter of the essential commodity secured 
against particular goods that in turn are imported.  For example, Cuba has a BPA for rice imports 
from Thailand and Vietnam.  Pakistan considered a BPA for wheat exports to Afghanistan, but 
instead opted to open a credit insurance line for private exports of wheat (FAO 2003).  Aside 
from finding a match in terms of a commodities required by the two participating countries to 
exchange, BPAs are likely to require a degree of underwriting which is usually by the respective 
central banks. 
A number of countries have export credit facilities, either formal institutions or facilitated by their 
respective central banks.  In addition to the example of Pakistan’s credit line for exports to 
Afghanistan, the USA ExIm Bank has been part of the wider US Government support to a post-
conflict Liberia with USD3.7 million credit line for wheat imports (US Mission Liberia 2015).   
Risk of weak or non-existent supervision of financial sector is likely to hit the credibility of 
banks, especially domestic banks.   
As part of this, Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) considerations 
need to be factored in to prevent the domestic financial sector being cut-off from making foreign 
transactions, as are heightened risk of fraud and banking collapse. 
The non-existence of a central bank and therefore supervision in Somalia effectively limited 
financial services to hawala money transfer agencies.  This meant no other formal financial 
services were available, until the re-opening of the Somali central bank in 2009 which has 
enabled formal banks to start to operate, the first in 2014 (AMISON 2014).  However the lack of 
effective supervision has meant that that Somali money transfer agencies risked having no 
access to a correspondent bank required to facilitate international financial transfers.  The UK 
government reportedly put pressure on Barclays to postpone its decision to end its 
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 In Islamic finance, a sales contract where the bank buys a product on behalf of a client and resells the product 
to the same client by clearly mentioning the cost incurred in buying the product and the margin or the mark-up 
when reselling the product to the client (Financial Times) 
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 The ITFC has supported trade finance in a number of IsDB member countries, including Murabaha-based 
Islamic finance mechanisms.  A complementary example is covered in support to a private sector sugar importer 
in Sudan, which also included a mechanism to cover exchange rate risks (which would of course would involve 
an additional cost).  See http://www.itfc-idb.org/en/content/itfc-entices-private-sector-sudan  
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 The African Export Import Bank was established in Abuja, Nigeria in October, 1993 by African Governments, 
African private and institutional investors as well as non-African financial institutions and private investors for the 
purpose of financing, promoting and expanding intra-African and extra-African trade (www.afroeximbank.com) 
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correspondent banking relationship with major money transfer agencies to Somalia (World Bank 
2015), as well as set up the Somali-U.K. Safer Corridor Pilot to be mobilized in the event of a 
significant disruption in remittances.  To more systematically address this challenge in light of 
capacity challenges, the Central Bank of Somalia recently agreed to delegate on a temporary 
basis the supervision of Money or Value Transfer Services to a trusted agent that will monitor 
compliance with AML/CFT standards (Erbenová 2016). 
Similarly Liberian banks faced challenges as a number of correspondent banks ended their 
relationship with domestic banks, which in turn meant trade-related credit was especially 
challenging to provide and which had representing about a third of domestic banks business 
(IMF 2016).  A number of small Pacific Island states have faced challenges, with a high cost 
impact on critical remittances. As the source of significant remittances to these Pacific Island 
states, New Zealand set up a Treasury-backed scheme for banks which enables low-cost 
remittances through the banking system’s international Automated Teller Machine and Electronic 
Funds Transfer at Point of Sale networks. The facility includes daily monitoring to mitigate 
financial integrity risks (Erbenová 2016). 
Inexperienced supervision and weak rule of law were identified as the main factors which 
enabled significant fraud at Afghanistan’s largest bank (Kabul Bank) in 2010, with the national 
government having to guarantee all deposits to prevent a wider banking crisis.  The estimated 
cost was 5% of GDP (IMF 2011) and it has required the splitting of the bank’s portfolio into a 
viable “good” bank, and an insolvent “bad” bank with efforts underway to recover part of the 
funds lost in the fraud. 
This issue of correspondent banks in particular is recognised as a challenge for a number of 
countries and territories, with the Financial Stability Board, IMF, World Bank and others tasked 
by the G20 to seek solutions.  These have included highlighting the importance of understanding 
the challenges, including domestic financial systems, to have contingency plans in place.  Where 
correspondent banks are unable or unwilling to operate, the potential of using public entities or 
centralized payment systems to address the challenge of international transfers could be an 
option.  However AML/CFT compliance by domestic public bodies (including relevant central 
banks) will still need to be addressed (Financial Stability Board 2016).  Mexico is on example 
where the challenge has been managed by setting up capacity in its central bank to receive 
remittances from the USA, and then distribute the USD within the domestic banking sector. 
Another consequence of central bank collapse is ability to print money.   
This can be linked to very high inflation where the cost and logistics of providing sufficient cash 
becomes challenging.  It can also occur where Central Banks simply do not have the funds to 
purchase the cash, or a central bank closure means there is no authority to provide the cash 
notes. 
In the case of Somalia, the USD has effectively taken over for most forms of exchange of value.  
The official Somali Shilling notes were last printed around 25 years ago.  However the Somali 
Shilling remains in circulation for more routine transactions, especially in rural areas.  Initially the 
lack of notes helped keep the value of the currency. However over time alternative versions were 
printed by a variety of agents including “rival war lords”, and with different degrees of acceptance 
(Economist 2012). The debasing of the currency has led to very significant fluctuations in the 
exchange rate, including being the currency that strengthened most against the USD in 2013 
(Financial Times 2014) following relative peace and inflows from returning Somalis investing in 
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their country of origin. The autonomous region of Somaliland has set up its own central bank who 
has overseen the provision of a separate currency.  In addition, mobile phone payment has taken 
off, with close to 40% of the adult population using mobile phone payments (World Bank Global 
Findex 2014), as a safer and easier alternative to cash and which the diaspora remittances 
helped get off the ground (Onyulo 2016). 
Zimbabwe has seen several periods of shortages of notes in circulation in recent years.  
Hyperinflation led to using the USD as the main currency after it was legalised in 2009.  The lack 
of small notes and change, and more recently, the lack of USD notes generally has led to a high 
usage of e-banking.  This is primarily transferring money through cell phones, and a rapid 
increase in the use of debit cards/Points of sale (PoS) for those with bank accounts (New York 
Times 2016). 
Preparing for a post-crisis/post-conflict reality 
Post crisis/post conflict situations will inevitably require a rapid re-building of the central bank 
given its key role in the macro-economy, and stability being a key building block to help ensure 
enduring peace.  Castillo (2008) makes the case for central banks to be ready to finance 
government (via domestic currency) even though this will have some short run inflationary 
consequences.  The initial costs of de-mobilising militia and other state-building priorities can 
mean that an early injection of resources is critical while donor and other resources slowly start 
to flow.   
Lawarne (2004) makes the case to ensure price stability, while recognising some inflation of 5%-
10% range is desirable to enable relative price shifts as the economy adjusts to a new reality.  
General preparedness, especially in terms of donor coordination if donor flows are likely to be 
significant, was a main factor in terms of more successful post-conflict economic recovery.  This 
includes preparedness for the likely surge of donor inflows (when absorption capacity may be 
challenged and risks over-valuing the exchange rate), and then phase out (when absorption 
capacity likely to have strengthened).   
Building an effective foreign exchange market is a priority to enable trade, with different 
advantages and risks to whether this is a floating rate, dollarized, currency board.  Preparing for 
distressed banking sector which will reflect wider economic challenges of small and larger 
business requiring financing to rebuild and unable to fully service outstanding debts.  Similarly 
ability to audit and ensure oversight of the financial sector is often a relevant priority, not least as 
conflict can enable war lords and illegal businesses to thrive, and who will have an interest to 
ensure a central bank is unable to affect their economic interests in a peace time economy.  
(Addison et al 2001). 
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 Potential options for countries in situations similar to 4.
Yemen 
These are reflections by the author, which may or may not apply to the actual realities faced by 
Yemen. 
The challenge of an increased spread between the official rate and the parallel rate. 
Fully recognising the political and technical challenges, a country seeing a significant difference 
between the official and parallel rate will struggle to maintain the official rate without it leading to 
greater shortages.  It is also likely to encourage significant rent seeking as those with access to 
the lower rates will be able to benefit in a market that will increasingly see prices set by the 
parallel rate. 
Options would include: 
Move to a close-to-unity exchange rate sooner rather than later, at least by reducing the margin 
by the official rate to mirror the parallel rate and by working to ensure the parallel rate is efficient 
and transparent. Where the authorities have some influence, a degree of moral suasion on the 
major parallel market traders can also help contain more speculative moves in the market but 
efforts to control the parallel market are unlikely to be very effective (or likely to be economically 
damaging).  However some prudence prior to the option of a full float maybe appropriate.  The 
lack of a central bank with significant reserves means there will be no level to manage the 
exchange rate.  This may result in more erratic fluctuations in the parallel market which the 
official rate may not wish to reflect. 
There may be a case for short-term humanitarian-type interventions that involve trying to 
facilitate imports at the lower official exchange rate and so reduce the risks of price hikes of 
sensitive items.  However it is an economically expensive option.  The large inflow of 
humanitarian food aid is likely to keep prices pressures down (on eg: wheat) more effectively as 
beneficiaries will tend to sell some of their food aid as a coping strategy.  The transaction costs, 
access to fuel and transport, growing rent seeking, and other constraints are likely to be at least 
as challenging for traders and so reflected in prices to consumers.  An overvalued official rate is 
a effectively a heavy tax on formal sector exporters (who will have to accept the lower rate for 
this to be passed to importers).  A fiscal transfer approach would be more transparent and 
efficient in the medium term, including export taxes if viable and transfers to eg, poorer sectors of 
the population (eg: via cash transfers).   
An alternative would be to actively influence the shift into foreign currency.  In times of crisis and 
conflict, economies will tend to run to what is seen as the safest currency, usually the USD. 
There is likely to be a better case to encourage the use of the currency of large neighbours; 
Saudi Rial (SAR) being an obvious one given the large number of remittances from Yemen’s 
large and wealthy neighbour.  It will also help avoid the challenge of lack of notes in terms of the 
foreign currency used; in Yemen’s case there is a physical surplus of Saudi currency in the 
country already. The foreign exchange option will have attractions; it will create a sense of 
stability and lower transactions.   
It will however mean Yemen will lose the benefits from seigniorage which can be worth circa 2% 
of GDP (though this figure will steadily be eroded if the shift to USD/SAR continues anyway). It 
will also make it even harder to gradually move back to a domestic currency, and so include 
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losing the flexibility of devaluation.  An oil-based economy would be reasonably well placed to be 
closely tied to the SAR.  A more labour-intensive exporter would benefit from greater exchange-
rate flexibility.  The full shift to the USD or SAR is unlikely to be economically desirable or 
politically feasible.  However official use of for example, the SAR alongside the Yemini Rial, may 
be a prudent option to help provide a sense of stability to the population and wider economy 
while seeking action to ensure there isn’t a growing gap between those with access to foreign 
exchange and those without.  However the choice of the SAR may well be optically challenging 
from a political perspective as well. 
Seeking credit lines for finance (essential) imports 
The challenge of securing credits lines will primarily be seen at the level of financial institution 
capacity to handle the finances (usually financing would involve domestic banks); capacity to 
oversee/guarantee the transaction which is usually a central bank role, and finally, how to ensure 
there is a subsequent cash flow that will enable re-payment (with profit/interest).   
A shift to a close-to-unity exchange rate would reduce part of the challenge; this would make 
sales of the imports be more easily converted back into foreign exchange against inflows from 
remittances. 
Accounts could be managed on behalf of the central bank to help manage the capacity 
challenges, though the guarantee of a regional/international financial institution is likely to be 
sought given the perceived and real risks. 
Alternatively a “friendly” country with export credit schemes for commodities such as wheat 
maybe willing to provide export finance, if this can be credibly structured with a degree of shared 
risk to help ensure repayment.  This option is likely to require using significant well-targeted 
political capital backed by a technically feasible proposal. 
Seeking to maintain capacity of domestic finance system 
Maintaining supervision and oversight would be highly desirable.  This could include helping 
ensure inflows, especially of remittances, in the short run which may include encouraging 
innovations to reduce costs and manage risk. Yemen’s economy will greatly benefit from an 
operating financial system; supporting the financial system’s resilience and capacity would be a 
clear win if possible.  The Somali example of outsourcing the oversight capacity may offer a 
workable option should this be an area of growing concern. 
Maintaining a sound replacement and flow of cash/notes.   
Providing the authorities are able to manage the risk of significant inflation, prioritising scarce 
foreign exchange to maintain a reasonable stock of domestic notes would be prudent.  Seeking 
to promote e-banking (eg: through mobile phone system) is likely to be of benefit for both cost 
savings (fewer notes will require replacement), and a way of increasing the resilience of the 
economy by offering an alternative to make simple payments and transfers, including for 
remittances. 
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Work with the international community sooner rather than later to prepare for a post-
conflict scenario. 
A number of papers highlight the importance of donor coordination, as in between donors 
including the IMF/World Bank and UN, as well as with relevant authorities. The focus should be 
on peace building and seeking a sustained political settlement; without this, it will be hard to 
move forward.  However within this context; politically sensitive macro-economic policy will be 
required to provide stability and confidence.  This will require a degree of re-planning and 
consensus between the main players.  At a more technical level, preparation for potential 
increase and then probable decrease of donor in-flows will be required to minimise damage to 
the macro-economy. 
 Conclusion 5.
The challenge for policy makers is to use the remaining economic levers available to minimise 
the distortions that have an economic cost.  This will mean working with the market using 
government, remittance, donor, and other flows where possible and seek to reduce transaction 
and other costs through realistic policy decisions.  Seeking to facilitate internationally backed 
credit lines can offer some relief; however there will need to be clarity on exchange rate 
challenges in terms of who bears the cost and facilitated access to foreign exchange required to 
repay the credit lines. 
Working with the market where feasible will in turn protect the population from the worst of abuse 
by those in positions of power who are able to extract resources or seek excessive profits. And, 
more positively it will help increase the economic incentives for trade and production in what is a 
very challenging environment for the legitimate market. 
The risk of no intervention is that new players will emerge who are often directly related to 
military or leading government officials.  In these situations, the momentum of private sector 
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